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Green and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism, whose 
strategies consist of individual valuations, guarantees eﬃciency in multi-unit auctions. 
Chen and Micali bypassed this impossibility by slightly enlarging the strategy spaces, yet 
assuming knowledge of the maximum value a player may have for a copy of the good, and 
the ability of imposing high ﬁnes on the players. For unrestricted combinatorial auctions, 
eﬃciency in collusion-resilient dominant strategies has remained open, with or without the 
above two assumptions. We fully generalize the notion of a collusion-resilient dominant-
strategy mechanism by allowing for arbitrary strategy spaces; construct one such mech-
anism for multi-unit auctions, without relying on the above two assumptions; and prove 
that no such mechanism exists for unrestricted combinatorial auctions, with or without any 
additional assumptions. Our results hold when the mechanism does not know who colludes 
with whom, and players in the same coalition can perfectly coordinate their strategies.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Collusion is a major problem in mechanism design, and in auctions in particular. Dominant-strategy mechanisms assure, 
under the most minimal of rationality assumptions, that the players will choose the desired strategies, but not in the 
presence of collusion. When the players act independently, in unrestricted combinatorial auctions the VCG mechanism 
guarantees eﬃciency in dominant strategies (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973). Yet, Ausubel and Milgrom (2006)
show that just two collusive players can destroy the eﬃciency of the VCG mechanism.3,4 It is therefore legitimate to ask 
whether eﬃciency in unrestricted combinatorial auctions can be guaranteed in “collusion-resilient dominant strategies”.
In a classical paper, Green and Laffont (1979) put forward one such notion, coalition incentive compatibility. In their 
collusion model,
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: deckel@alum.mit.edu (A. Deckelbaum), silvio@csail.mit.edu (S. Micali).
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3 They may focus on revenue, but their example also shows that eﬃciency is destroyed.
4 Chen and Micali (2012) show that a collusive group in the VCG mechanism might not have a dominant strategy subproﬁle, and thus, depending on 
their beliefs about the other players’ strategies, eﬃciency may be destroyed.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.008
0899-8256/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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(b) The members of each coalition can perfectly coordinate their actions; and
(c) Coalitions are secret and non-overlapping.
Note that the Green–Laffont collusion model is quite unrestricted. For example, the players of a coalition can make side-
payments and enter binding contracts with each other. A mechanism need not know who colludes with whom, and a player 
need not know anything about the players outside his coalition. Non-overlapping coalitions is a restriction, but a natural 
one when the focus is on dominant-strategy implementation.5
In their collusion model, Green and Laffont prove that coalition-incentive-compatible mechanisms are unable to imple-
ment many social choice functions of interest. In particular, no eﬃcient multi-unit auction mechanism satisﬁes their notion. 
However, while their collusion model is unrestricted, their notion of dominant-strategy collusion resilience is not, and their 
result applies only to mechanisms in which a player can only report a single valuation.
In the Green–Laffont collusion model, Chen and Micali (2012) propose a more general notion of a collusion-resilient 
dominant-strategy mechanism. Crucially, they allow a player to report not only a single valuation, but also a set of other 
players: allegedly, the set of his colluders. (As we shall see, we heavily rely on their insight in our ﬁrst theorem.) They prove 
that one such mechanism guarantees eﬃciency in multi-unit auctions, where m identical copies of the same good need to 
be allocated. Their mechanism never has negative revenue. However, two drawbacks limit its applicability. Namely, their 
mechanism is assumed to
(1) know an upper bound, V , to the players’ possible values for a copy of the good, and
(2) be able to impose ﬁnes greater than 2mV , even when all bids are low.
Both requirements are problematic. The ﬁrst because no upper bound for the players’ possible values for a copy of the 
good may exist, let alone be known to the mechanism. The second because, to ensure that it exceeds any possible value a 
player may have for a copy of the good, V might be astronomically high, and 2mV even higher. Therefore, a player may 
not have suﬃcient funds to pay such a ﬁne. If it is not credible that the envisaged ﬁne is enforceable, then the whole 
dominant-strategy structure of their mechanism collapses.
The possibility of guaranteeing eﬃciency in unrestricted combinatorial auctions by means of a non-negative-revenue 
mechanism, whether practical or not, has remained totally open.
In this paper, we adopt the Green–Laffont collusion model, but propose a fully general notion of collusion resilience 
in dominant strategies. As before, we demand that each coalition C (including a singleton coalition) has a best strategy 
subproﬁle, no matter what the players outside C may do. What differentiates our approach from the prior ones is that we 
do not envisage any restrictions on the strategy spaces of the players. In essence, we take the fundamental insight of Chen 
and Micali (i.e., that enlarging the strategy spaces may yield collusion resiliency) to the hilt, and allow for arbitrary strategy 
spaces. This extension has signiﬁcant implications on whether or not eﬃciency is achievable in collusion-resilient dominant 
strategies. Speciﬁcally, we prove two theorems.
Theorem 1 shows how to modify the mechanism of Chen and Micali for multi-unit auctions, with non-increasing 
marginal valuations, so as to guarantee eﬃciency (in the Green–Laffont collusion model) without the two problematic 
assumptions discussed above. Although inspired by their mechanism, ours need not know any bound on the players’ valua-
tions and need not impose on any player ﬁnes larger than the values reported by that player.
Our mechanism, M, presupposes the ‘decriminalization’ of collusion. Indeed, when all players, collusive or not, use the 
best strategies available to them, M may deduce signiﬁcant information about who colludes with whom. The criminaliza-
tion of collusion, however, is not theoretically necessary, if one can design mechanisms that are collusion-resilient.
Theorem 2 shows that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee eﬃciency in unrestricted com-
binatorial auctions in the Green–Laffont collusion model. Our impossibility result is of course unrelated to the possibility 
result of Chen and Micali (2012), and also requires a proof technique totally different from that of Green and Laffont. Indeed, 
our impossibility proof applies to all possible mechanisms, no matter what their strategy space might be. Moreover, it holds 
even for auctions with only two goods and three players.
Let us also mention that weaker notions of collusion resilience have been previously considered in the literature. As put 
forward by Schummer (2000), bribe proofness requires that no two players can beneﬁt by colluding together in a particular 
manner. The notion of c-truthfulness, due to Goldberg and Hartline (2005), assumes that each coalition has at most c
members. Other notions of collusion resiliency envisage that the players are incapable of making side payments; see Maskin
(1979), Moulin and Peleg (1982), Suh (1996), Moulin (1999), Barbera and Jackson (1995), Jain and Vazirani (2001), Moulin 
and Shenker (2001), Pal and Tardos (2003). Laffont and Martimort (2000) and Che and Kim (2006) also study collusion 
resilience using equilibrium-based solution concepts. Collusion leveraging, as put forward by Chen et al. (2010), aims at 
leveraging the players’ knowledge about the payoff types of their opponents.
5 Indeed, a player belonging to two distinct coalitions may ﬁnd it impossible to simultaneously maximize the utility of both of them. Should this case 
occur, his preferences would be unspeciﬁed.
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Auction contexts. In an auction, a player’s type is also called a valuation.
In a multi-good auction, a valuation is a function mapping the empty subset to 0, and every other subset of the goods to 
a non-negative real number.
The set of players is N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, the number of goods is m, the set of all possible valuations of a player i is i , 
and the true valuation of player i is θ∗i . An outcome ω is a pair (A, P ), where A = (A0, . . . , An) is a vector of subsets of 
the goods and P is a proﬁle of numbers. Vector A is referred to as the allocation of ω and must be such that Ai ∩ A j = ∅
whenever i = j. Component A0 represents the set of unallocated goods, and, for i > 0, Ai represents the subset of the 
goods allocated to player i. Each Pi represents the price paid by player i. For each player i, i’s utility function ui maps a 
valuation θi and an outcome ω = (A, P ) to ui(θi, ω)  θi(Ai) − Pi . For brevity, when the true valuation of a player i is clear, 
we may write ui(ω) instead of ui(θ∗i , ω). An allocation A is eﬃcient if 
∑
i θ
∗
i (Ai) ≥
∑
i θ
∗
i (A
′
i) for all allocations A
′ .
In a multi-unit auction, all m items for sale are identical copies of the same good. As traditionally done, starting with 
Vickrey (1961), we assume that valuations have non-increasing marginals.6 We will represent a valuation of a player i by 
a vector of non-negative real numbers, ti = t(1)i , . . . , t(m)i , such that t(1)i ≥ · · · ≥ t(m)i ≥ 0. That is, t( j)i represents i’s marginal 
value for a j-th copy of the good. An allocation A is a sequence of n + 1 non-negative values whose sum is m, A =
A0, A1, . . . , An , where A0 is the number of unallocated copies and, for i > 0, Ai is the number of copies allocated to 
player i. An outcome ω is a pair (A, P ), where A is an allocation and P a proﬁle of prices. The utility of a player i with 
valuation ti for an outcome ω = (A, P ) is ∑Aij=1 t( j)i − Pi .7 All other notions and notations for multi-good auctions (such as 
eﬃciency and ui(ω)) automatically extend to multi-unit ones.
Auction mechanisms. As for any other mechanism, an auction mechanism M speciﬁes:
• For each player i, the set Si of pure strategies available to i, and
• a function (traditionally also denoted by M) mapping each strategy proﬁle in S = S1 × · · · × Sn to an outcome (A, P ).
For s ∈ S , we denote by M(s) the outcome generated by M and by ui(M(s)) the corresponding utility of player i. If M is 
probabilistic, M(s) is a distribution over outcomes, and ui(M(s)) is the corresponding expected utility of i. If the underlying 
mechanism M is clear, we may write ui(s) instead of ui(M(s)).
Additional notation. Let i be a player and A a subset of players. Then,
• For every proﬁle x, xA is the subproﬁle obtained by restricting x to A.
• S A and A respectively are the Cartesian products ∏i∈A Si and 
∏
i∈A i .• −A is the set N \ A and −i is the set −{i}.
3. Collusive rationality
A partition of a set T is a collection of subsets T1, . . . , Tk of T such that ∪i T i = T and Ti ∩ T j = ∅ whenever i = j.
The Green–Laffont model. Before the mechanism is executed (but possibly after the mechanism has been announced), the 
players are free to form an arbitrary partition of N . The formed partition, the collusive partition, is denoted by C. A set in C
is called a coalition. A player i is independent if {i} ∈C.
If C ∈C, then C is common knowledge among its members, but a player in C need not have any additional information 
about C. The mechanism has no information about C.
Focusing on auctions, for each subset C of the players, the collective utility function of C , uC , maps a valuation subproﬁle 
θC ∈ C and an outcome ω to ∑i∈C ui(θi, ω). When the valuation subproﬁle θC under consideration is clear, we may write 
uC (ω) instead of uC (θC , ω). If C is a coalition, then its players can perfectly coordinate their actions,8 and act so as to 
maximize uC .
Collusive solution concepts. A pure strategy subproﬁle sA ∈ S A is (weakly) dominant for a subset of players A if 
uA(sA, s−A) = maxs′A∈S A uA(s′A, s−A) for all s−A ∈ S−A .
A mechanism is collusive dominant-strategy if for every subset of players A and every true valuation subproﬁle θ∗A ∈ A , 
there exists a pure strategy subproﬁle dA ∈ S A that is dominant for A.
6 Besides being natural and traditional, this assumption is also crucial to rule out the already discussed destructive phenomena of Ausubel and Milgrom 
(2006), and to allow the existence of collusion-resilient multi-unit auction mechanisms like the that of Chen and Micali (2012) and ours.
7 If Ai = 0, then, according to usual conventions, ∑Aij=1 t( j)i is 0.
8 E.g., the members of a coalition can enter binding agreements and make side payments to each other.
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valuation subproﬁle θ∗A ∈ A , and every strategy subproﬁle s−A ∈ S−A , the collective utility of A is non-negative under dA . 
That is, uA(dA, s−A) ≥ 0.
Eﬃciency in collusive dominant-strategies. A collusive dominant-strategy auction mechanism M is eﬃcient if, for every 
collusive partition C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck and every true valuation proﬁle θ∗ , the outcome M(dC1 , . . . , dCn ) is an eﬃcient 
allocation for θ∗ .
4. A practical collusive dominant-strategy mechanism for multi-unit auctions
Our multi-unit auction mechanism modiﬁes the one of Vickrey (1961).
4.1. The standard Vickrey mechanism
In the mechanism of Vickrey (1961) for multi-unit auctions, a strategy consists of reporting a single valuation. Given 
a proﬁle t of reported valuations, the mechanism constructs a sequence of n · m “value-owner” pairs {(t(k)i , i) : i ∈ N, k =
1, . . . , m}, ordered in decreasing order with respect to the ﬁrst (“value”) component. We call the ﬁrst m pairs in the sequence 
the “winning pairs” and all other ones the “losing pairs”. For each player i, we let mi be the number of winning pairs with 
owner i. The mechanism allocates mi copies of the good to i, identiﬁes the ﬁrst mi losing pairs whose owner is not i, and 
charges i the sum of the values of these pairs.
The Vickrey mechanism is eﬃcient in dominant strategies in absence of collusion, but not otherwise (Chen and Micali, 
2012).
4.2. The intuition behind our mechanism M
To describe our mechanism M, we ﬁnd it useful to present ﬁrst an ‘auxiliary’ mechanism M′ guaranteeing eﬃciency 
under a solution concept that is very strong, but weaker than dominant strategies (that is, dominance after a single round 
of removal of dominated strategies). We then show how to modify M′ to obtain our collusive dominant-strategy, collusively 
rational, and eﬃcient mechanism M.
Mechanism M′ . In M′ , each player reports a sequence of m “value-beneﬁciary” pairs, (v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm), where 
(vc, bc) ∈ R × N signiﬁes that the bidding player is willing to pay an amount vc in order for player bc to receive an 
additional copy of the good. For instance, if n = 5, m = 3 and player 2 reports ($10, 3), ($8, 2), ($4, 3), then player 2 declares 
that he is willing to pay to the mechanism $10 for a copy of the good to be awarded to player 3, $8 for a copy to be 
awarded to himself, and $4 for an additional copy to be given to player 3.
Given all these reports, M′ transforms each “value-beneﬁciary” pair into a “value-beneﬁciary-owner” triplet. If, as in the 
example above, player 2 reports ($4, 3) as one of his pairs, then M′ constructs ($4, 3, 2) as the corresponding triplet. After 
that, M′ orders all n ·m triplets in decreasing order by their value component, breaking ties by the beneﬁciary component 
(in any ﬁxed order), and then by the owner component (in any ﬁxed order). We call the ﬁrst m triplets in the sequence 
the “winning triplets” and all others the “losing triplets”. For each player i, let mi be the number of winning triplets with 
beneﬁciary i, and let m′i be the number of winning triplets with owner i. Then, M′ allocates mi copies of the good to i, 
identiﬁes the ﬁrst m′i losing triplets whose owner is not i, and charges i the sum of the value components of these triplets.
An intermediate solution concept. As M′ is not our ﬁnal mechanism, we do not deﬁne the solution concept under which 
M′ can be proved to be eﬃcient, nor do we discuss such a proof. We simply provide some intuition in a very informal 
manner.
Assume for a moment that each player only bids value-beneﬁciary pairs whose beneﬁciary belongs to his own coalition. 
Then, it can be proven that the following strategy subproﬁle is dominant for each coalition C : one member of C , i∗C , bids the 
m pairs (v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm), corresponding to the m highest marginal valuations of players in C , and all other members 
of C bid pairs with value 0. We refer to such a report as a “smart strategy subproﬁle”. Clearly, when all coalitions choose 
smart strategy subproﬁles, the allocation returned by M′ is eﬃcient.
However, if some player j /∈ C bids a pair (v, b) where b ∈ C , then the above strategy subproﬁle need not be dominant 
for C . For instance, suppose there are two copies of the same good, and two players, 1 and 2, both independent and 
both valuing $10 a ﬁrst copy and $5 a second one. Assume that player 1 truthfully bids the sequence ($10, 1), ($5, 1), but 
player 2, for whatever reason, bids ($8, 1), ($7, 2). Under this bid proﬁle, player 1 gets both goods (which of course is not 
an eﬃcient allocation) and pays $7, so that his utility is $8. Player 1 would be better off, however, bidding ($5, 1), ($0, 1), 
so as to get one copy for a price of zero and have a net utility of $10. When player 1 is truthful, player 2 gets no goods, 
pays $5, and his utility is −$5. Notice that reporting ($8, 1), ($7, 2) is, for player 2, dominated by reporting ($8, 2), ($7, 2). 
More generally, in M′ , it is always best for a player to name only beneﬁciaries in his own coalition.
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From M′ toM. We modify M′ by having each player i bid either (1) a “representative” player j ∈ N , or (2) a sequence 
of m “value-beneﬁciary” pairs (v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm). In the ﬁrst case, only the representative j has permission to declare 
a value-beneﬁciary pair with i as a beneﬁciary, while in the second case no other player has permission to declare a pair 
with i as a beneﬁciary. If any player declares a value-beneﬁciary pair with a disallowed beneﬁciary, that pair is discarded 
by the mechanism.
We must ensure, however, that i never has incentive to name a player outside of his collusive group as a representative. 
Namely: if any player k reports a pair with beneﬁciary i, and if k is not i’s declared representative, then the mechanism not 
only discards the pair but also forces k to pay to i an amount of money equal to the value of the discarded pair. With this 
modiﬁcation, i will never have incentive to name an outside player k as his representative: i would be better off discarding 
k’s reported pair, receiving the money from k, and (if desired) reporting the pair himself. We formalize the implementation 
of this idea in Section 4.3.
4.3. Our mechanism M
Strategies. Our mechanism is of normal form. Every player i, simultaneously with his opponents, reports a strategy si ∈
N ∪ (R+ × N)m . That is, for every strategy si of player i, either
• si is a player, si ∈ N , or
• si is a sequence of m pairs, si = (v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm) ∈ (R+ × N)m .
A player i reporting si ∈ N is called passive. In this case, we refer to si as “i’s representative”, denoted by Rep(i).
A player i reporting si = (v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm) ∈ (N × R+)m is called active. In this case we refer to each (v j, b j) as a 
value-beneﬁciary pair, with value v j and beneﬁciary b j .
Choosing the outcome. When the players report a strategy proﬁle s, the mechanism chooses to allocate the copies of the 
goods and the price charged to each player by means of the following steps:
1. Initialize L to be an empty list of “value-beneﬁciary-owner” triplets.
2. For each active player i and value-beneﬁciary pair (v, b) reported by i:
(a) If either (i) b = i or (ii) b is passive and Rep(b) = i,
then append the value-beneﬁciary-owner triplet (v, b, i) to L.
(b) Otherwise, i makes a payment of v to b.
(Call Ri the net payment of i after all executions of step 2b.)
3. Sort the value-beneﬁciary-owner triplets of L in decreasing order by their value component. (If needed, break ties ﬁrst 
by beneﬁciary, and then by owner, in lexicographic order.)
(Call the ﬁrst m triplets “winning” and the remaining triplets “losing”.)
4. Each player j receives mj copies of the good, where mj is the number of winning triplets with beneﬁciary j.10
5. For each active player i:
(a) Let m′i be the number of winning triplets with owner i.
(b) Identify the ﬁrst m′i losing triplets in L whose owner is not i and (in addition to any payments from step 2b) have 
player i pay to the mechanism an amount Q i equal to the sum of the value components of these triplets.11
Note that, in M, the ﬁnal price paid by a player i is Pi = Ri + Q i . (As usual, if Pi is positive, then i disburses money, and 
otherwise he receives money.)
4.4. Analysis
Theorem 1. Mechanism M is collusive dominant-strategy, coalitionally rational, and eﬃcient.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary collusive group A. We begin with three claims:
Claim 1. Arbitrarily ﬁx a strategy subproﬁle sA for the players in A and a strategy subproﬁle s−A for the other players. Then there exists 
a strategy subproﬁle ˜sA ∈ S A such that
9 Indeed, if every coalition C ′ eliminates all strategy subproﬁles that are dominated for C ′ , then for every coalition C , a smart strategy subproﬁle is dominant 
for C with respect to all surviving strategies.
10 If L contains fewer than m winning triplets, the remaining goods are unallocated.
11 If there are fewer than m′i such triplets, instead charge i the sum of the values of all such triplets.
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(b) for all i ∈ A,
if i is passive in ˜si , then ˜si ∈ A
(i.e., i chooses his representative in his own coalition)
if i is active in ˜si , then the beneﬁciaries of all pairs in ˜si are in A.
Proof of Claim 1. For all i ∈ A, we construct ˜si by modifying the original strategy si according to the following (exhaustive) 
three cases.
1. Player i is active in si and (v1, j1), . . . (vm, jm) are his value-beneﬁciary pairs.
Then player i is active in s˜i . He bids all pairs (vl, jl) from si for which jl ∈ A. For the remaining pairs, if any, 
he bids (0, i).
2. Player i is passive in si but nominates a player j /∈ A as his representative.
Then player i is active in ˜si and chooses his m value-beneﬁciary pairs as follows:
• If j is passive in s−A , then ˜si consists of m pairs (0, i).
• If j is active in s−A , letting (v1, i), . . . , (vk, i) denote all the value-beneﬁciary pairs of s j with beneﬁciary i, set ˜si to 
consist of the k pairs (v1, i), . . . , (vk, i) and the m − k pairs (0, i).
3. Player i is passive in si and nominates a player j ∈ A as his representative.
Then ˜si = si .
Let us ﬁrst show that each player in A receives at least as many copies of the good under (˜sA, s−A) as he does under 
(sA, s−A). Indeed, we shall argue that the triplets with beneﬁciary in A inserted into L under these two strategy proﬁles 
differ only in their owner components, with the exception that, under (˜sA, s−A), additional triplets may be inserted into L
with value 0 and beneﬁciary in A. This holds because of the following observations:
• (Case 1 above) For any i ∈ A who is active in si , we have only removed his pairs (v, j) when j /∈ A. Furthermore, for 
any pair (v, j) with j ∈ A, this pair “survives” into L under s only if either j = i or j is passive with Rep( j) = i. In both 
of these cases, the pair will also survive into L under (˜sA, s−A).
• (Case 2 above) For every i ∈ A who is passive with Rep(i) = j /∈ A in si , there are up to m triplets (v1, i, j), . . . , (vk, i, j)
which are inserted into L under (sA, s−A) but not under (˜sA, s−A). The triplets (v1, i, i), . . . , (vk, i, i) are, however, 
inserted into L under (˜sA, s−A) but not under (sA, s−A).
• (Case 3 above) For every i ∈ A who is passive with Rep(i) = j ∈ A in si , there are two simple subcases. First, if j is 
passive in s j , then there will be no triplets with beneﬁciary i added to L under either (˜sA, s−A) or (sA, s−A). If instead j
is active in s j , then the triplets (vk, i, j) which are inserted into L under (˜sA, s−A) are precisely the same as the triplets 
(vk, i, j) inserted into L under (sA, s−A).
Therefore, changing from (sA, s−A) to (˜sA, s−A) affects only the owner component of triplets inserted into L with beneﬁciary 
in A, possibly appends additional triplets with value 0, and might remove triplets with beneﬁciary outside A. Since M
breaks ties according to the beneﬁciary components of triplets before the owner components, every winning triplet under 
(sA, s−A) has a corresponding winning triplet under (˜sA, s−A).
Moreover, we claim that the net amount charged to A (i.e., 
∑
i∈A Pi) under (˜sA, s−A) is no more than the net amount 
charged to A under (sA, s−A). Indeed, if a player i ∈ A is passive in si with Rep(i) ∈ A, then Ri is the same and Q i = 0 in 
both scenarios. If i is passive in si with Rep(i) /∈ A, then the amount he is newly charged in step 5b of M is no more than 
the additional amount he receives in step 2b. That is, in the original scenario Q i was 0, and in the new scenario may have 
become positive, yet the increase in Q i is no more than the decrease in Ri . Thus, it is in i’s interest to “discard” triplets 
with owner outside of A, receive payment equal to the discarded triplets’ values, and declare the appropriate pairs himself.
Finally, if i is active in si , then Ri either stays the same or decreases in the second scenario, while Q i may increase or 
decrease. However, denoting by A′ the subset of the coalition A who are active in sA , a simple case analysis shows that ∑
j∈A′ Q j does not increase in (˜sA, s−A). The only crucial case to consider is when, for some i, j ∈ A′ ,  ∈ A, and k /∈ A, 
a triple (x, k, i) was winning in (sA, s−A), but after replacing (x, k, i) with (0, i, i) a previously losing triple (x′, , j) now 
wins in (˜sA, s−A). In this case, Q j increases by at most x′ , while Q i decreases by at least x′ . 
Claim 2. Arbitrarily ﬁx a strategy subproﬁle s−A for −A. Let ˜sA be a strategy subproﬁle for A satisfying property (b) of Claim 1, namely:
• For i ∈ A, if i is passive in ˜si , then ˜si ∈ A.
• For i ∈ A, if i is active in ˜si , then the beneﬁciaries of all pairs in ˜si are in A.
Then there exists a subproﬁle s′A ∈ S A such that (i) a single player in A, i′, is active, (ii) all other j ∈ A are passive and s′j = i′ (i.e. 
Rep( j) = i), and (iii) uA(s′A, s−A) ≥ uA (˜sA, s−A).
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(˜sA, s−A), are “winning” in L and have beneﬁciary bi ∈ A.
Set s′A to be the strategy subproﬁle where a single i′ ∈ A bids the pairs (v1, b1), . . . , (vk, bk) along with m − k pairs 
(0, i′). Comparing the execution of step 2 of the mechanism under the strategy proﬁles (s′A , s−A) and (sA, s−A), we note the 
following differences: (i) the new triplets (v1, b1, i′), . . . , (vk, bk, i′) and m − k triplets (0, i′, i′) are appended to L under 
(s′A, s−A) but not under (sA, s−A), (ii) the triplets (v1, b1, q1), . . . , (vk, bk, qk) are appended to L under (sA, s−A) but not 
under (s′A, s−A), and (iii) the losing triplets with beneﬁciary in A which are appended to L under (sA, s−A) are not 
appended under (s′A, s−A).
Since for every winning triplet (vl, bl, ql) under (sA, s−A) with bl ∈ A there is a corresponding triplet (vl, bl, i′) under 
(s′A, s−A) differing only in the owner component, and since the ordering on L breaks ties lexicographically by beneﬁciary 
before owner, it is clear that the allocation under (s′A , s−A) assigns every player in A at least as many copies of the good 
as under (˜sA, s−A). (We note i′ might receive additional copies under (s′A, s−A) if any of the m − k new triplets (0, i′, i′) are 
winning.) Furthermore, removing non-winning triplets from L does not affect the ﬁnal allocation and does not increase the 
price Q j charged to any player j in step 5b.
It is clear that the amount Q i′ charged to i′ in step 5b under (s′A, s−A) is no more than the net amount 
∑
j∈A Q j charged 
to all of A in step 5b under (˜sA, s−A). Indeed, by having a single player declare all of the pairs with beneﬁciary in A, more 
of the high-value triplets are skipped when computing the price in step 5b. In short, the subproﬁle s′A avoids the scenario 
where a triplet owned by a player in A causes the price paid by a different player in A to increase. We note that any 
payments R j received by players j ∈ A from step 2b are the same under the two strategy proﬁles. 
Claim 3. Let dA be a strategy subproﬁle for A of the following form:
• A single player i∗ ∈ A is active. He declares the m triplets (v1, ji), . . . , (vm, jm) corresponding to the m highest marginal valua-
tions amongst players in A.12
• All other players j ∈ A are passive and announce d j = Rep( j) = i∗ .
Then dA is a best response of A against every s−A ∈ S−A .
Proof of Claim 3. By Claim 1 and Claim 2, it suﬃces to show that uA(dA, s−A) ≥ uA(s′A, s−A), where s′A is any strategy 
subproﬁle such that a single i′ ∈ A is active and all other j ∈ A declare Rep( j) = i′ .
We notice that under all such strategies s′A , the player i′ owns all the triplets in L which have beneﬁciary in A. The 
only remaining relevant features of the strategy subproﬁle are the pairs which i′ bids. From the perspective of i′ , he is 
playing a standard Vickrey auction of a single good of limited supply, where his marginal valuations are the maximum of 
the marginal valuations in A. Thus, truthfully declaring the m highest marginal valuations is best for i′ . A formal proof of 
this fact is nearly identical to the proof that the standard Vickrey auction is truthful. Therefore, if i∗ = i′ then we are done. 
For the case where i∗ = i′ , one only need to notice that all strategy subproﬁles of the form described in Claim 3 result in 
the same outcome for A. 
Finally, notice that, for every proﬁle of true valuations and every collusive partition C = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak , when all 
coalitions Ai play the dominant subproﬁle dA as in Claim 3, the resulting allocation is eﬃcient. This holds since, under this 
strategy proﬁle, one representative from each Ai bids truthfully on behalf of the m highest marginal valuations of Ai , no 
pairs are discarded in step 2b of M, and the triplets with the m highest valuations are winners. 
In the mechanism M, choosing a strategy sub-proﬁle sC , dominant for a coalition C , is trivial if the valuations of the 
members of C are common knowledge among C . Note, however, that M does not require such common knowledge. It only 
requires that the m value-beneﬁciary pairs announced by the representative of a coalition C are indeed ‘optimal’ for C .13
Also note that M has some form of robustness. Informally speaking, when the players are not perfectly rational, but are 
suﬃciently rational to avoid ﬁnes and to have the representative of each coalition C report m value-beneﬁciary pairs that 
are suﬃciently good for C , then M generates a suﬃciently good social welfare.
Further note that M does not depend on the way in which the members of C choose their representative, nor on the 
way in which they choose to “split their proceeds” (issues important in the collusion literature). This independence, of 
course, makes Theorem 1 only stronger. The only requirement is that the m value-beneﬁciary pairs announced by every 
coalition C (via its representative) are indeed ‘optimal for C ’.
12 For example, suppose A = {1, 2}, m = 3, player 1’s value of obtaining a ﬁrst, second, and third copy of the good are $10, $6 and $2, respectively, and 
player 2’s values of obtaining an additional copy of the good are $9, $7, and $5. Then the active player would bid ($10, 1), ($9, 2), and ($7, 2). In the event 
of a tie among the marginal valuations, i∗ can break the tie lexicographically according to the beneﬁciary.
13 In fact, this value-beneﬁciary information need not be known within C a priori. For instance, it may be computed via some sort of iterative process 
within C , where some member proposes an initial set of m pairs, which is then “locally corrected” by some other member, over and over again, until no 
more corrections are made.
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all payments for the copies of the good received by all members of C . (This simpliﬁcation clearly leverages the ability that 
coalition members have, in our model, to enter all kinds of binding contracts, including contracts about money transfers.) 
We could modify our mechanism — and its proof — so that each member of a coalition pays directly for the copies he 
receives in a way similar to Vickrey mechanism. We wish to stress, however, that this modiﬁcation does not imply that 
we should disallow a coalition’s ability to contract internal money transfers. Indeed, the meaningfulness of Theorem 1 (and 
Theorem 2) is enhanced when no restrictions are imposed on the abilities of members of a coalition, so long as they act to 
maximize the sum of their individual utilities.
Finally, note that mechanism M is collusive dominant-strategy whether or not one allows contractual post-auction 
transfer of copies of the good among members of the same coalition. If one allowed such transfers, then M would also 
have additional collusive dominant strategies. For instance, a distinguished player in a coalition could bid the coalition’s 
top marginal valuations always naming himself as the only beneﬁciary, while every other member i in the coalition bids 
(0, i) for each copy of the good; and after the auction the distinguished player distributes the goods optimally amongst 
the members of his coalition. (With such transfers, even the original Vickrey mechanism would be eﬃcient in collusive 
dominant strategies.)
5. A simple generalization of the revelation principle
In the next section we prove that no coalitionally rational and collusive dominant-strategy mechanism exists for unre-
stricted combinatorial auctions. Our proof applies to mechanisms with arbitrary strategy sets. (Already for our multi-unit 
auction mechanism M, the pure strategies of a player i do not coincide with his set of possible valuations, i .) To simplify 
our analysis we argue, very much in the spirit of the revelation principle, that we need to consider only mechanisms with 
very speciﬁc strategy sets. Namely,
Deﬁnition 1. A collusive dominant-strategy mechanism M is hyper-truthful if:
• For each player i, Si = {(A, θA) : A ⊆ N, i ∈ A and θA ∈ A} and
• For every A ⊆ N , the strategy subproﬁle tA where every j ∈ A selects strategy (A, θ∗A) ∈ S j is dominant for A.
In every collusive dominant-strategy mechanism, the optimal strategy subproﬁle for a set A of players depends only 
on the set A and the true type subproﬁle θ∗A of the group, and not on the strategies or collusive structure of the outside 
players. Therefore, hyper-truthful mechanisms suﬃce in view of the following fact, whose proof is nearly identical to that 
of the revelation principle of Myerson (1979).
Fact 1. If there exists an eﬃcient, coalitionally rational, collusive dominant-strategy auction mechanism M, then (for the same number 
of players and number of goods) there also exists an eﬃcient, coalitionally rational, hyper-truthful mechanism M ′.
Roughly, the proof of Fact 1 is as follows: Let M be eﬃcient, coalitionally rational, and collusive dominant-strategy. 
We will construct M ′ . For each player i, deﬁne the function f i mapping strategies of M ′ (which are of the form 
{(A, θA) : A ⊆ N, i ∈ A and θA ∈ A}) to strategies for player i in M by the rule that f i(A, θA) is the i-th component of 
the pure strategy proﬁle dA which is dominant in M ′ for a collusive group A with their true valuations θA . The outcome 
of mechanism M ′ under strategy proﬁle 
∏
i(Ai, θAi ) is deﬁned to be the outcome of M under strategy proﬁle 
∏
i f i(Ai, θAi ). 
When all players of M ′ report truthfully, the outcome is identical to the outcome of M when each coalition A selects the 
dominant strategy subproﬁle dA , and thus is eﬃcient. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists some A ⊆ N
and θ∗A ∈ A such that the strategy subproﬁle 
∏
i∈A(A, θ∗A) in mechanism M ′ was not a dominant subproﬁle for a collusive 
group A with true type θ∗A . Then there exists a strategy subproﬁle 
∏
j /∈A(A j, θA j ) for mechanism M ′ such that the strategy 
subproﬁle 
∏
i∈A(A, θ∗A) is not a best response. However, this means that 
∏
i∈A fi(A, θ∗A) is not a best response in M for the 
collusive group against the subproﬁle 
∏
j /∈A f j(A j, θA j ), which contradicts the assumption that 
∏
i∈A fi(A, θ∗A) is a dominant 
subproﬁle in M .
For example, let us show how our mechanism M can be transformed into a hyper-truthful mechanism M∗ . In an 
execution of M∗ , denote by (Ai, θAi ) the strategy selected by each player i. Then M∗ works by simulating an execution of 
M as follows: If i is the lexicographically ﬁrst player in Ai , then he is made active and made to bid the m highest marginal 
valuations in θAi . Otherwise, i is made passive and made to declare his representative to be the lexicographically ﬁrst player 
in Ai .
Remark. Fact 1 is not, strictly speaking, a corollary of the revelation principle. This is so because a player’s information 
about his own coalition is not an “original type”. Indeed, the players partition themselves arbitrarily into collusive groups 
after a mechanism is announced. In principle, for one mechanism the players might want to collude in pairs, while for 
another mechanism they might want to collude in triples, and so forth. Nevertheless, the proof of the above fact follows 
from applying the revelation principle “conditionally on the collusive partition”.
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Theorem 2. In combinatorial auctions with at least 3 players and 2 goods, no collusive dominant-strategy mechanism can be both 
coalitionally rational and eﬃcient if either 1) no upper bound exists on the maximum possible valuations or 2) the mechanism never 
has negative revenue.
Proof. 14 In light of Fact 1, it suﬃces to prove our thesis for mechanisms which guarantee eﬃciency in collusively dominant 
hyper-truthful strategies.
We proceed by contradiction. Assume the existence of an eﬃcient, coalitionally rational, dominant-strategy hyper-truthful 
mechanism M for combinatorial auctions with 3 players and 2 goods. We derive a contradiction by showing that, when 
no upper-bound exists for a player’s value for a subset of the goods, then M must pay an inﬁnite amount of money to 
the players when they report a special valuation proﬁle. More precisely, for every x > 0, as long as every player may value 
5x a subset of the goods, then M must return revenue ≤ −x whenever all players report that they belong to the same 
coalition and that they all value 0 every subset of the goods. (This would already be a contradiction for the case of bounded 
valuations, if the mechanism were required never to lose money.)
We obtain this contradiction via a sequence of 7 scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, all players are independent and the true 
context and the bids are as follows:
Truth
Player Coalition Type
{a} {b} {a,b}
1 {1} 5x 0 5x
2 {2} 0 5x 5x
3 {3} 0 0 2x
Bids
Player Declared 
coalition
Type 
subproﬁle
1 {1} (5x,0,5x)
2 {2} (0,5x,5x)
3 {3} (0,0,2x)
Scenario 1
Faced with these bids, M must allocate good a to player 1, good b to player 2, and nothing to player 3, since it is 
eﬃcient. Let us now argue that the prices charged in Scenario 1, which we denote P (1)1 , P
(1)
2 , and P
(1)
3 , are ≤ 0. We note 
ﬁrst that P (1)3 ≤ 0 follows immediately from individual rationality, since player 3 receives no goods. Suppose now that 
P (1)1 =  > 0. Then player 1 would have incentive to change his bid to {1}, (/2, 0, /2). In fact, by changing his strategy 
in this manner, while the bids of the other two players are unchanged, he would still be allocated the good (because the 
so modiﬁed bid proﬁle could have been truthful and M is eﬃcient), but would be charged at most /2 (because the so 
modiﬁed bid proﬁle could have been truthful and M is individual rational). This contradicts the fact that bidding truthfully 
is a dominant strategy for player 1 in Scenario 1. Therefore, P (1)1 ≤ 0. A similar argument shows that P (1)2 ≤ 0.
Consider now the following scenario, borrowed from Ausubel and Milgrom (2006):
Truth
Player Coalition Type
{a} {b} {a,b}
1 {1,2} x/2 x/2 x/2
2 {1,2} x/2 x/2 x/2
3 {3} 0 0 2x
Bids
Player Declared 
coalition
Type 
subproﬁle
1 {1} (5x,0,5x)
2 {2} (0,5x,5x)
3 {3} (0,0,2x)
Scenario 2
That is, players 1 and 2 are collusive but not truthful, so that the bids are identical to those of Scenario 1. Accordingly, 
M returns in Scenario 2 the same outcome as in Scenario 1. In particular, in Scenario 2 the collective utility of coalition 
{1, 2} is at least x. Consider now the following scenario:
Truth
Player Coalition Type
{a} {b} {a,b}
1 {1,2} x/2 x/2 x/2
2 {1,2} x/2 x/2 x/2
3 {3} 0 0 2x
Bids
Player Declared 
coalition
Type
subproﬁle
1 {1,2} ( x2 , x2 , x2 ) ( x2 , x2 , x2 )
2 {1,2} ( x2 , x2 , x2 ) ( x2 , x2 , x2 )
3 {3} (0,0,2x)
Scenario 3
14 If n > 3 or m > 2, we can extend the proof below by making the extra players and goods “irrelevant”. That is, we can consider identical examples where 
only the ﬁrst three players ever have (or declare) non-zero valuations and where no player ever has (or declares) any value for goods beyond the ﬁrst two.
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since M is hyper-truthful, it must produce an outcome in which the collective utility of coalition {1, 2} is at least x. (Else, 
players 1 and 2 could increase their collective utility by bidding as in Scenario 2.) Furthermore, because M must return an 
eﬃcient allocation when the bids are truthful, it must allocate both goods to player 3. Thus, to ensure that the collective 
utility of {1, 2} is at least x, M must pay to players 1 and 2 a total of at least x (i.e., P (3)1 + P (3)2 ≤ −x). We now consider 
Scenario 4:
Truth
Player Coalition Type
{a} {b} {a,b}
1 {1,2} 0 0 0
2 {1,2} 0 0 0
3 {3} 0 0 2x
Bids
Player Declared 
coalition
Type
subproﬁle
1 {1,2} ( x2 , x2 , x2 ) ( x2 , x2 , x2 )
2 {1,2} ( x2 , x2 , x2 ) ( x2 , x2 , x2 )
3 {3} (0,0,2x)
Scenario 4
Since the bids of Scenario 4 are identical to those of Scenario 3, M must return the same outcome. That is, the coalition 
{1, 2} obtains no items but receives a total payment of at least x. We now consider Scenario 5:
Truth
Player Coalition Type
{a} {b} {a,b}
1 {1,2} 0 0 0
2 {1,2} 0 0 0
3 {3} 0 0 2x
Bids
Player Declared 
coalition
Type
subproﬁle
1 {1,2} (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
2 {1,2} (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
3 {3} (0,0,2x)
Scenario 5
Under the bids of Scenario 5, since M is eﬃcient, both goods must be allocation to player 3. Furthermore, since M
is hyper-truthful, the coalition {1, 2} must collectively receive at least as much utility as in Scenario 4, and thus must 
collectively receive a net payment of at least x. Finally, player 3 could only receive money from M (that is, P (5)3 ≤ 0), since 
otherwise (analogously to the argument above) he would have incentive to lower his bid and still receive the goods. We 
now consider Scenario 6:
Truth
Player Coalition Type
{a} {b} {a,b}
1 {1,2,3} 0 0 0
2 {1,2,3} 0 0 0
3 {1,2,3} 0 0 0
Bids
Player Declared 
coalition
Type
subproﬁle
1 {1,2} (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
2 {1,2} (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
3 {3} (0,0,2x)
Scenario 6
The bids of scenario 6 are identical to those of scenario 5. Thus, the collective utility of coalition {1, 2, 3} is −P (5)1 −
P (5)2 − P (5)3 , which is at least x. Finally, we consider Scenario 7:
Truth
Player Coalition Type
{a} {b} {a,b}
1 {1,2,3} 0 0 0
2 {1,2,3} 0 0 0
3 {1,2,3} 0 0 0
Bids
Player Declared 
coalition
Type 
subproﬁle
1 {1,2,3} (0,0,0)3
2 {1,2,3} (0,0,0)3
3 {1,2,3} (0,0,0)3
Scenario 7
Since M is dominant-strategy hyper-truthful, the coalition {1, 2, 3} must obtain at least as much net utility in Scenario 7 
as they do in Scenario 6. Thus, the three players together must receive a net payment of at least x. 
Remark. Theorem 2 holds because the mechanism must work properly no matter how high a player’s value for a subset of 
the goods may be. However, if (1) an upper bound V to every possible value that a player may have for a subset of the 
goods exists, and (2) negative revenue is not a problem, then there is an hyper-truthful, collusively rational, and collusive 
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revenue”.15
Note that the proof of our impossibility result for general combinatorial auctions still holds even in the setting where 
players within a coalition have the ability to re-distribute the goods among themselves after the auction.16
7. Final remarks
As collusion is a major problem in mechanism design, it is useful to develop strong notions of collusion resilience. It is 
also useful to construct mechanisms that, like M for multi-unit auctions, guarantee such resilience in dominant strategies 
without additional assumptions.
The fact that no such mechanisms exist for unrestricted combinatorial auctions is a ‘fact of life’ (but such combinatorial 
auctions are also problematic in many other ways). This fact too, however, is useful to know.
In sum, it is important to understand which social choice functions are implementable in a collusion-resilient way (and 
hopefully without any special assumptions) and which are not so implementable. For example, it is important to study how 
much revenue can be guaranteed in a collusion-resilient way.
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